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Given the pressure to find liquidity, GPs may face trade-offs  
between maximizing financial returns and ensuring the  
preservation of portfolio companies’ mission, and therefore,  
many wonder if GPs will sacrifice mission in exchange for  
financial returns.
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Impact investing provides investors opportunities to generate social and environmental value through 
their investable assets. Over the past decade, limited partners have increased capital allocations to 
socially driven private equity funds. In turn, these funds have increased investment in mission-driven 
portfolio companies with the goal of increasing the size of their revenues and assets, and the scope  
of their impact. As funds mature, the general partners (GPs) who manage them must find liquidity 
in their portfolio(s) in order to provide returns to their limited partner (LPs) investors1. For impact 
fund managers, the pressure to find liquidity may be particularly pronounced since the impact  
industry remains nascent and relatively unproven. In fact, the field is so new that critics and supporters 
see every exit as a proof point. Given the pressure to find liquidity, GPs may face trade-offs between 
maximizing financial returns and ensuring the preservation of portfolio companies’ missions, and 
therefore, many wonder if fund managers will sacrifice mission in exchange for financial returns.
To evaluate the interplay of liquidity and mission preservation in impact investing, the Wharton  
Social Impact Initiative (WSII), under the supervision of Dr. David Musto and Dr. Christopher 
Geczy, conducted a rigorous survey of 53 impact investing private equity funds from around the world. 
In the study, WSII evaluated a set of enabling factors and constraints that contribute to mission  
preservation, specifically 1) the extent to which LPs granted GPs legal permissions to pursue impact 
in investment and exit decisions; 2) the degree to which GPs obtain control or influence over exit 
outcomes; 3) financial performance of realized investments in the sample to evaluate the context in 
which GPs pursue social or environmental impact; and 4) overall financial performance of the industry 
to assess whether poor performance is placing further pressure on GPs to find financially optimal  
exits. In traditional investment arrangements between fund managers and investors, GPs are held 
to professional standards and legal requirements to make investment decisions that deliver maximum 
risk-adjusted financial returns for LPs. However, in impact investing, virtually all GPs surveyed in  
the sample reported that LPs permitted them to pursue impact as part of the investment decision- 
making process, and in most cases required them to do so. The mandates are reflected in legally  
binding agreements like Limited Partner Agreements or Private Placement Memoranda. 
However, some question whether LP permissions or mandates are sufficient to protect company  
missions. According to survey responses, GPs usually do not obtain a controlling interest of their  
portfolio companies’ boards of directors, and therefore have little control over exit decisions. 
03
1 General partners are the fund managers who provide capital for portfolio companies, whereas limited partners are the   
 investors or institutions that provide capital for the GP to invest.
“According to survey responses, GPs usually do not obtain a controlling interest of 
their portfolio companies’ board of directors, and therefore have little control over 
exit decisions.”
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Despite the seeming lack of control, GPs remain optimistic about mission preservation. For nearly  
all exits that were not write-offs, GPs reported that the mission continued post exit. A prevailing  
explanation from funds is that the social or environmental impact is inherent to the business model  
of portfolio companies and therefore does not rely on mandates from an acquirer. 
Given the surveyed GPs’ near-universal optimism towards mission preservation, WSII examined  
whether a clear financial tradeoff materialized in their investments. A common critique of impact  
investing broadly is that investors must expect concessionary financial returns in exchange for pursuing  
a social or environmental impact. While there does in fact remain a spectrum of return expectations in  
the industry, many funds seek to obtain market-rate returns. WSII assessed the financial performance  
of the subset of funds seeking market-rate returns, assuming that the tension between financial  
performance and mission preservation would be most acute in this group. Thus, the question becomes,  
do the impact funds specifically seeking market-rate returns receive concessionary returns? 
Several calculations of financial performance suggest that market-rate-seeking funds could in fact 
achieve their targeted returns while also preserving portfolio companies’ missions. In other words,  
the data show that impact funds did not have to make concessions in order to preserve the portfolio 
companies’ missions upon exit. 
The first calculation used by WSII was the public market equivalent (PME)2, a calculation that  
provides a time weighted measurement that assesses performance relative to a market index.  
Specifically, it shows a ratio of performance between an investment and a selected market index (for 
example, a PME calculation of 1.00 indicates identical performance between an investment and a 
selected benchmark index over a set time horizon, and a PME greater than one indicates that an 
investment outperformed the market index). A pooled end-to-end aggregate PME calculation for the 
170 market-rate-seeking investments in the sample returns a PME gross of fees, expenses, and  
carried interest of 0.98 (12.94%3 IRR, 9.03%4 mIRR)5, compared to a spliced Russell Microcap/Russell 
2000 index, indicating nearly identical performance with the market index. Further segmentation of 
the data demonstrates that mission-aligned exits (as reported by GPs) returned a PME of 3.09 (33.52% 
IRR, 10.34% mIRR), whereas the larger universe of exits returned a PME of 2.46 (35.01% IRR, 
10.85% mIRR). This early data suggest aligned exits can demonstrate financial success. Among the 
sample, concessionary financial returns were not required to preserve the social or environmental effect 
of impact investments.
2  See Sorensen, M. and Jagannathan, R. (2014) for a detailed explanation of the PME methodology.
3  This return is using “Method 2” in the Methodology section.
4  Using a finance rate and reinvestment rate of 12%. See Gottschalg, O. and Phalippou, L. (2007). The Truth About Private  
 Equity Performance. Harvard Business Review, December 2007.
5 All figures presented in this analysis are gross of fees, expenses, and carried interest.
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Other studies have examined median returns for a group of funds, but without further clarification of 
selection bias or a calculation of a confidence interval it is difficult to assess the representativeness of the 
findings for the industry at large.
In addition to the pooled aggregate calculations above, WSII examined individual fund performance 
and conducted statistical analysis in order to better understand the industry at large. By comparing 
individual performance of market-rate-seeking funds, WSII found a median PME of 0.957 compared 
with the spliced Russell Microcap/ Russell 2000 index, and calculated a confidence interval between 
0.74 and 1.15. The confidence interval means the researchers are 95% certain that the true median 
performance of the whole industry lies between 0.74 and 1.15. Although the median fund in the 
sample did perform slightly below the index (since median PME < 1), the data suggest that the 
researchers cannot reject above a 95% confidence level that in general, impact-investing funds perform 















35.01% 10.85% 2.46 2.56 9/30/2001-
9/30/2014




33.52% 10.34% 3.09 3.26 9/30/2001-
9/30/2014
               16
Realized Market-Rate-Seeking Funds’ Mission Aligned  
Exits Versus All Market-Rate-Seeking Exits
6  The data require an additional independent review to meet academic standards. WSII’s analysis is heavily dependent on the 
 accuracy and availability of source documents from GPs. 
7 This calculation is performed using “Method 2” in the Methodology section.







S&P 500  
PME
Time # Portfolio  
Companies
All 12.94% 9.03% 0.98 1.00 1/1/2000-
12/31/2014
170
Exits Only 18.59% 9.46% 1.46 1.55 1/1/2000-
9/30/2014
51
End-to-End Gross Performance of Realized and Unrealized  
Market-Rate-Seeking Funds’ Aggregate Portfolio Companies6
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Market-rate-seeking impact investments in the sample, therefore, may be financially competitive on  
a gross basis with other equity investing investment opportunities. This financial performance  
may be why impact fund managers often assert that there is little inherent tension between profits 
and “purpose.”
This lack of tension may be driven by funds’ use of an “embedded impact” strategy. In other words, 
impact fund managers use a pre-investment screening process to invest only in companies with  
products or services that are inherently impactful, making impact core to the investee’s business model. 
For impact investors at large, the research findings highlight the importance of the due diligence stage 
of the investment process. 
However, beyond concerns related to mission preservation, broader questions remain about the  
responsibility of GPs to encourage long-term impact. For example, some investors continue to  
question whether it is even a GP’s purview to influence or control post-exit performance after the GP 
is out of the deal. Alternative and innovative forms of financing may be more consistent with the goals 
of impact investors, for example, and some posit that a more effective way of growing value would be 
to hold portfolio companies until they become large or successful enough to dictate the mission-related 
terms of their exits or to become acquirers themselves.9
The following report includes deeper discussion about the context, methodology, sample set  
characteristics, findings, and implications of the research.
9 To address these issues, investors will need more quantitative and data-driven information that fall beyond the scope of this  
 report, such as additional metrics on social impact pre and post exit, and further clarity on the long-term impact for which they  
 are accountable. 
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Introduct ion
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
investors seeking to achieve financial returns as well as measurable social  
or environmental impact from their investments.10 
In particular, impact investing in the private equity realm gained serious attention due to its dramatic 
growth and potential to bring transformative change to social and environmental problems. Some  
impact-investing private equity firms have been capitalizing on these so-called double and triple  
bottom line returns11 for years.12 Despite anecdotal success, however, the industry does not benefit 
from an academically rigorous analysis of social, environmental, and financial performance. While 
the industry continues to attract new investors and additional capital13, institutional investors remain 
reluctant to dedicate larger sums of capital for impact in the absence of clear evidence regarding impact 
funds’ financial performance. Further, impact investing in private equity is only sustainable and  
scalable to the extent that it produces financial returns comparable to the targeted returns set by  
general partners (GPs)14 themselves. For many GPs, this means achieving market-rate returns.15
The combination of a growing number of deals alongside an abiding focus on market-rate returns  
raises an important set of questions. Closed-end funds eventually provide their limited partners (LPs) 
with liquidity by exiting investments. As existing portfolios mature and fund managers look for exit 
opportunities, practitioners have identified several fundamental considerations:
  Will the impact fund’s exit affect the company’s social or environmental mission? 
  Are incentives aligned between funds, portfolio companies, and acquirers to ensure the  
   preservation of company missions? 
  What happens if there is tension between mission preservation and the economics of  
   the exit?
10 The 2015 Impact Investor Survey by J.P. Morgan and the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) finds, “a 7% growth in  
 capital committed between 2013 and 2014 and a 13% growth in number of deals” among 82 organizations. Respondents  
 report an expected increase in capital raised from US $4.7 billion in 2014 to US $7.1 billion in 2015. See “Eyes on the  
 Horizon: The Impact Investor Survey”. J.P. Morgan, Global Impact Investing Network. Retrieved from http://www.thegiin.org/ 
 binary-data/RESOURCE/download_file/000/000/662-2.pdf 
11 Triple bottom line refers to financial, social, and environmental outcomes.
12 The World Economic Forum estimates there are more than 300 such funds around the world. See Drexler, M., & Noble, A.  
 (2014). Impact investing: A primer for family offices. Retrieved from http://www.weforum.org/reports/impact-investing- 
 primer-family-offices
13 In the 2015 Impact Investor survey, funds reported an average target of 44 investees representing $85mm in total invested  
 capital for 2015, a projected increase of 21% in the number of companies receiving funding and 18% more capital delivered  
 than in 2014. 
14 General partners are the fund managers who provide capital for portfolio companies, whereas limited partners are the  
 investors or institutions that provide capital for the GP to invest.
15 In the 2015 JP Morgan/GIIN Impact Investor Survey, 55% of respondents report seeking “competitive, market-rate returns.” 
10
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Industry research provides insight into some of these questions. The 2015 Impact Investor Survey by 
J.P. Morgan and the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) indicates that firms do consider mission 
preservation at exit. According to the report, 61% of impact investors try to mitigate this risk, and 
those that do use three general methods: they (1) select investees who embed impact into their core 
mission (51%); (2) select an acquirer that they believe will protect the mission (30%); or (3) set  
specific objectives to hold an acquirer accountable to the mission (13%). Of investors who do try to 
mitigate this risk, most point to the embedded impact of the company as the primary method  
of preserving mission.
The Wharton Social Impact Initiative (WSII) built from other industry and academic research to  
assess financial return results within the context of their social or environmental impact. The interplay 
between liquidity and mission drift is a pressing concern for investors concerned with preserving  
impact, as well as those seeking market-rate returns. The impact investing industry is nascent and  
relatively unproven, so analysis relies on small sample sizes. WSII deployed methodologies not yet 
applied to the impact industry, like public market equivalents, modified internal rates of return, and 
confidence intervals around performance, to better understand the implications for the industry  
despite the small sample size. 
WSII focused on the link between liquidity and mission preservation, and collected and analyzed data 
from impact-investing private equity funds to explore four key components of this link:
1. Permission – Do fund managers have sufficient legal latitude from their LPs to make mission-aligned 
 investment choices?
2. Control – Assuming fund managers have appropriate permissions, do they have sufficient control of 
 company boards of directors to determine the exit outcomes?
3. Motivation – What is the financial performance of mission-aligned exits to date?
4. Overall Industry Performance – What might be expected of financial and social performance 
 moving forward? 
“WSII deployed methodologies not yet applied to the impact industry, like public  
market equivalents, modified internal rates of return, and confidence intervals  
around performance, to better understand the implications for the industry.”
11
Great Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing
16 WSII based the definition of “impact investor” on the criteria developed by the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN). The  
 GIIN defines impact investing as “investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate  
 social and environmental impact alongside a financial return.” See, GIIN: About impact investing at http://www. thegiin.org/ 
 cgi-bin/iowa/resources/about/index.html
17 WSII crafted its initial outreach list by working with organizations like B Lab, Emerging Markets Private Equity Association  
 (EMPEA), Anthos Asset Management and scanning available lists like ImpactBase and the Impact Assets 50. Through these  
 resources, WSII compiled a contact database of 437 funds. To date, WSII has distributed more than 200 invitations to fund  
 managers for participation in the study. As of August 14, 2015, 53 total impact funds, representing 557 portfolio investments,  
 had submitted responses to the WSII database. 
18 WSII recognizes that investments in several asset classes can be considered impact investments. However, the scope of this  
 report is limited to private equity investments.
19 The Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) provides an assessment of impact measurement at the fund and portfolio  
 company level. See b-analytics.net/giirs-ratings for additional information.
20 For this report, WSII did not attempt to measure the social or environmental impact of portfolio companies but rather explored  
 evidence of intent and perception of mission preservation. The researchers determined analysis of impact metrics to be   
 outside the scope of this report, as there is only sparse standardized or easily verifiable data in this regard. WSII recognizes  
 the importance of measuring impact and hopes to pursue more research on this topic in the future.
In 2014, WSII began targeting private equity funds from around the globe that self-identified as 
impact investors16 or investors whose portfolios contained impactful companies (e.g., foundations).17 
With this in mind, WSII specifically sought GPs that self-reported positive return expectations and  
the intention to create measurable social or environmental impact through private equity and  
mezzanine financing investments.18In conjunction with Wharton finance faculty, WSII developed a 
data collection survey instrument, with 89 unique variables spanning both fund- and transaction-level 
data. Under strict confidentiality protocol, WSII also requested source documents such as annual 
audited financial statements, quarterly reports, private placement memoranda (PPM), limited partner  
agreements (LPA), modifying side letters, and late-stage term sheets. With express permission from 
participating funds, WSII also gathered data directly from B Lab for funds that have undergone the 
Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) rating process.19
Definit ions
Two definitions in this report call for particular clarification. WSII asked respondents a pair of  
questions about mission preservation for every exit by the fund. For every liquidity event reported, 
WSII asked if there were 1) statements in the realization agreement to pursue the social or  
environmental impact of the underlying portfolio company and 2) whether the fund believed the  
mission of the company persisted post exit. Based on these responses, WSII observed exits within 
two categories of alignment:
A.  Aligned Exits – those that the fund manager believed the mission persisted post exit, and
B. Deeply Aligned Exits – those that included a statement to pursue the mission in the  
   realization agreement. 
Answers to these questions serve as proxies for estimating mission preservation of exited portfolio 
companies.20
About  the  Research:  Scope,  Focus ,  and Methodology
12
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Valuations
WSII calculated internal rates of return, cash multiples, modified internal rates of return, and public 
market equivalents by aggregating transaction-level cash flows end-to-end by quarter from all GPs  
that had provided data by August 14, 2015. In addition to the aggregate calculations, WSII examined  
individual performance of funds compared to market indices to calculate individual funds’ PMEs. 
Table 1 summarizes the strengths and limitations of each of these calculations. 
21 See Sorenson, M. and Jagganathan, R. (2013). The Public Market Equivalent and Private Equity Performance. Or see Kaplan,  
 S. and Schoar, A. (2005). Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows. The Journal of Finance, Vol  
 LX, No 4, August 2005.
22 See Gottschalg, O. and Phalippou, L. (2007). The Truth About Private Equity Performance. Harvard Business Review,  
 December 2007. 
23 The mIRR calculation is sensitive to the direction, sequence, and weight of cash flows.
Method Strengths Limitations
Internal Rate of  
Return (IRR)
Easy point of comparison  
with other research reports to  
fund documents
Assumes a reinvestment rate at IRR, which can  
exaggerate the magnitude of extreme performers
Accounts for timing of cash flows Possible distortion of aggregate cash flows due to switching 
signs (cash in/cash out)
“Absolute performance measure that does not adjust for  
market return or risk of investments”21
Cash Multiple Requires no assumptions  
to calculate
Time value is not factored
Public Market  
Equivalent (PME)
Benchmark measurement  
against other equity investment  
opportunities
Not a widely reported metric of  
performance for industry participants
Mitigates macro level impacts  
on performance
Modified Internal  
Rate of Return  
(mIRR)
A more accurate measure of  
performance than the IRR22
Calculation can be distorted by the small cash flow amounts  
at the start of the aggregate cash flow
Possible distortion of aggregate cash flows due to switching 
signs (cash in/cash out)23
Table 1
Yes No
Yes Deeply Aligned X**
No Aligned Not Aligned
Does the realization agreement 
include a statement to  
pursue the social / environmental  
impact objective of the  
underlying company?
Do you believe that the social or environmental impact  
persisted after the company exited the fund?
(**WSII had no observations in this category, presumably because all instances of reported statements to pursue impact 
led to a corresponding belief in the preservation of the company’s mission.) 
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24 See Kaplan, S. and Schoar, A. (2005). Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows. The Journal of  
 Finance, Vol LX, No 4, August 2005.
25 Sample includes 81 portfolio companies from market-rate-seeking funds reported held at cost out of a total of 170 portfolio  
 companies analyzed (48%).
For the public market equivalent, WSII used two benchmark indices with which to compare  
performance of investments in the dataset. The first benchmark is a spliced Russell index. This  
benchmark tracks the Russell 2000 Growth index from 2000 to 2005 and the Russell Microcap index 
from 2006 to 2015. The benchmark is spliced in an effort to most closely mirror the types of  
investments between private equity and small, publicly traded companies. The second benchmark is 
the S&P 500 Total Return index. Although the S&P 500 is not highly comparable in terms of private 
equity investments, it is a common reference for performance that has been used in other previous 
academic research.24 
Since this is a global study, WSII encountered a high variability of valuation standards among funds. 
Determining a proper valuation for unrealized investments held on balance sheets is a challenge.  
Some funds assign a Fair Market Value (FMV) to unrealized investments whereas other funds elect  
to use valuation standards that hold unrealized investments strictly at cost. WSII used several  
methodologies to account for these differences and to permit analysis. The overall performance of  
all investments (realized and unrealized) is largely dependent on how conservatively or aggressively  
valued are the unrealized investments.25 With this understanding, WSII presents performance  
calculations based on several different valuation methods in order to show the spread of possible  
performance using various assumptions.
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Held at FMV or Cost Held at FMV or 
(Cost x (Val FMV/Cost FMV))
Excluding those at cost
This method holds open  
investments at reported value, 
either at a GPs’ FMV or at cost  
of the investment. It uses  
valuations as they are reported  
on financial documents. 
This method adjusts the  
valuations of the companies  
held at cost by applying a ratio 
derived from the other open 
investments valued by GPs. By 
analyzing the initial cost of FMV 
investments compared to the 
reported holding value, WSII 
determined a ratio to apply to all 
companies held at cost. 
This method disregards the open 
investments held at cost. It does 
not make any further assumptions 
about companies held at cost and 
does not attempt to adjust the 
values of any portfolio companies. 
Table 2
14
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26 Out of 170 transactions for market-rate-seeking funds, 32 portfolio company valuations were reported in foreign currencies  
 and were converted into USD using historical rates at the time of cash in or cash out.
27 For historical treasury rate data used for this report, see http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/ 
 interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=longtermrateAll
There are additional important caveats for the data and analysis. First, the data are verified to WSII’s 
best efforts but require an additional independent review to meet academic standards (i.e., for  
publication in an academic journal). This report reflects an initial analysis of the available information. 
WSII will engage in an independent review of the data and reserves the right to append and modify 
findings if necessary. Second, the data only represent information that was provided to WSII as  
of August 14, 2015. Third, WSII’s reconstructed cash flows and values of cash in and cash out of  
the aggregate fund are dependent on the availability of source documents, and WSII assumes all  
source documents provided from GPs are accurate. In a handful of cases, source documents were not  
provided for the full life of the fund. In this event, cash flows were generated only from the available 
source documents, and WSII assumed a realization event at the time of the last data observed. Without 
additional information, the team did not speculate whether the fund continued to hold the investment. 
Finally, all cash flows were converted to US dollars using historical exchange rates at the time of cash in 
and cash out.26 For modified rate of return calculations, the finance and reinvestment rates were held 
constant, with the most conservative measure using historical long-term composite >10 year Treasury 
bond rates and another measure using a generally accepted industry standard rate of 12%.27
15
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Descr ipt ion of  Sample
WSII obtained information from 53 impact investing private equity  
funds, representing 557 individual investments. The sample size is  
modest, but sufficient to yield initial observations. The following section 
describes the current composition of the dataset.
Size of Funds 
The median fund size in terms of the amount of committed capital in the sample is US $22.5 
million. Over three quarters (77%) of the sample is composed of funds with fewer than US $50  
million in committed capital. Only 8% of the funds in the sample have more than US$100 million 



























The sample’s geographic investment focus is wide ranging but with a weight towards Latin America 
(26%) and Africa (21%). Other areas of investment focus include Europe, the United States, East/ 
Southeast Asia, and South Asia.28 In the survey, funds could select up to three areas of focus before 
being considered a global fund. 
28 East/Southeast Asia includes investments in China, Japan, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand. South Asia includes India and  
 Bangladesh.
Fund Size by Committed Capital (in USD)
Funds’ Area of Investment Focus (Maximum of 3 Selections)
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29 Hybrid funds include combinations of debt and equity at various investment levels. 
30 See 2015 J.P. Morgan/GIIN Impact Investor survey for more detail.
31 Compared to the 2015 J.P. Morgan/GIIN survey, which found 55% of respondents seeking market-rate returns.
Fund Size by Type
Funds self-identified as one of the following classifications: buyout, growth private equity, mezzanine,  
venture capital, angel investor, or hybrid.29 Venture capital and growth private equity comprise  
nearly two-thirds of committed capital (65%) and number of funds (70%) in the sample, but  
hybrid, mezzanine, and buyout funds demonstrate the largest average committed capital per fund. 
Financial  Return Goals
Impact investing private equity spans a spectrum of return expectations.30 While the industry does 
not have a consistent taxonomy or specific language to describe these variations, WSII used three 
commonly used categories to distinguish between funds seeking market-rate returns, below but close 
to market-rate returns, and returns closer to capital preservation. Sixty percent of funds in the sample 
reported seeking market-rate returns.31
Fund Type Total Committed  
Capital
# Funds Average Committed  
Capital
Venture Capital $775,805,723.00 21 $36,943,129.67
Growth PE $607,544,500.00 16 $37,971,531.25
Hybrid $466,390,628.00 8 $58,298,828.50
Mezzanine/Buyout $280,700,000.00 6 $46,783,333.33
Angel Investor $2,250,000.00 2 $1,125,000.00
Funds by Type and Size (in USD)
Market-rate-returns
Below but close to market rates
Capital Preservation
Other






Which of the following statements best describes  
your fund’s financial return goals?
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32 While the number of employees may serve as a proxy for the overall size of funds’ underlying companies, respondents were not  
 asked to differentiate between the status of those employees (e.g., full time or part time). 
33 See http://www.thegiin.org/binary-data/ImpactBaseSnapshot.pdf for more information.
Portfol io Company Characterist ics
Beyond the fund-level descriptors above, WSII also examined some key attributes of underlying  
portfolio companies in the sample. Responding funds report a majority (52%) of their portfolio 
companies as profitable. In terms of employment, 61% of the sample consists of companies with fewer 
than 100 employees. Seven percent of the sample report more than 1,000 employees.32
Sample Bias Considerations
The sample size creates inherent challenges, but WSII sought to understand how representative  
the sample may be of the overall industry. Using available sources of information from ImpactBase,  
the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), and Thomson One, the researchers compared  
characteristics of survey participants to those of funds from the overall industry to assess whether  
the current sample is subject to observable biases. WSII examined the number of portfolio  
companies per fund, the number of funds per management company, and committed capital per  
fund. The number of funds under management and the number of portfolio companies are proxies  
for size and success, while committed capital is a proxy for size and maturity.
When comparing number of portfolio companies and funds under management, the current sample  
appears similar to nonparticipants. When looking at committed capital, this report’s dataset skews 
toward slightly smaller and potentially less mature funds. For example, the ImpactBase Snapshot33  
indicates that the average fund’s committed capital is USD$52.5 million, whereas WSII’s average 
fund’s committed capital is USD$40.2 million. Additionally, an element of survivorship bias exists 
among the sample, as WSII obtained data only on funds that are or were managed by firms that 
remain in business.
“When comparing number of portfolio companies and funds under management,  
the current sample appears similar to nonparticipants. When looking at committed  
capital, this report’s dataset skews toward slightly smaller and potentially  
less mature funds.”
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Findings
As the impact-investing industry scales and grows, issues pertaining  
to liquidity and mission preservation remain a concern for private  
equity investors. WSII was particularly interested in exploring financial 
performance in the context of whether the social or environmental impact 
of portfolio companies was preserved following a successful exit from one 
of the sample funds.
WSII examined four components of the link between liquidity and mission preservation: legal  
permission to pursue impact, the degree to which fund managers have control to influence exit  
decisions, motivation to pursue mission-aligned exits, and overall financial performance of the sample. 
The following provides more detail on each component. 
1. Permission
Do fund managers have contractual latitude, or “permission,” to protect mission if it  
potentially conflicts with the economics of the deal?
In traditional investment arrangements between fund managers and investors, GPs are held by  
professional standards and legal requirements to make investment decisions that deliver maximum 
risk-adjusted financial returns for LPs. In the context of impact investing, many LPs expect that  
investment decisions include a consideration of social or environmental impact. GPs must weigh  
their fiduciary duty to their LPs with the impact mission of the fund. WSII asked respondents to  
report the level of structural protection for fund managers to consider non-fiduciary factors in  
their investment decisions. 
Unsurprisingly, survey respondents report the vast majority of Limited Partner Agreements, Private 
Placement Memoranda, or other comparable investment agreements either explicitly allow or, in  
most cases, require fund managers to consider mission in investment decisions. Specifically, 90%  
have investment or legal documents that explicitly allow fund managers to consider social and/or  
environmental issues and 70% go so far as to require them to do so.
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2. Control
Do funds have sufficient control over exit decisions to ensure mission preservation?
Most venture or private equity-backed companies are led by a board of directors which make major 
decisions, including those related to exiting investments. It is customary for investors to acquire  
a percentage of controlling votes on portfolio company boards of directors at the time of investment.  
To control exit outcomes, mission-aligned investors must control a majority of the seats, either alone or 
with allies, unless contractually enabled to influence decisions beyond the scope of their size and board 
composition (e.g. through minority shareholder rights). In practice, the composition of company 
boards often changes many time throughout the life cycle of an investment. For instance, impact  
investors may find themselves co-investing with traditional investors who demand their own  
representation. As impact companies grow and require larger sources of capital, the (usually smaller) 
impact investors may see their influence eroded.
“Does your fund’s Private Placement Memorandum (PPM), side letter,  
Limited Partner Agreement (LPA), or other comparable investment agreements 
 include specific language that states any of the following? (Select all that apply)”
Requires GP to consider social and/or
environmental practices
Explicitly allows GP to consider social practices
Explicitly allows GP to consider 
environmental practices
Does not reference social and/or 
environmental issues
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Funds in the sample mostly reported that they do not 
control sufficient percentages of votes on boards of  
directors to determine exit decisions. For 77% of the 
portfolio companies in the dataset, mission-aligned  
investors – voting together as a block – had not 
secured 50% or more of the votes required to control 
exit decisions. Although impact funds’ own charters may 
provide latitude to consider non-financial factors in exit 
decisions, funds may not be in a position to influence 
these decisions to an appreciable degree.












“What percentage of votes does your firm,  
and other investors aligned with your mission,  
control in relation to decisions about the  
investors’ exit from the company?”
3. Motivation
Do company missions persist after impact funds exit investments?
WSII asked fund managers to report whether realized investments, either at a gain or loss, maintained 
company missions after the investment exited the fund. A separate question asked fund managers 











Deeply Aligned Exit Aligned Exit
Does the realization agreement include a  
statement to pursue the social/environmental  
impact objective of the underlying company?
Do you believe that the social or  
environmental impact persisted after  
the company exited the fund?
*Note: “No” response includes 11 write-offs *Note: “No” response includes 11 write-offs
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34 Eleven write-offs are included in the numbers above.
Funds virtually always report that the mission persists  
in companies that are sold or acquired, even though  
a lower percentage report having statements in the 
realization agreements. It is important to note that GPs 
reported write-offs in this sample.34 By definition, a 
company that is liquidated cannot continue its impact 
mission. Removing write-offs leaves only 2/42 (5%) 
instances when a GP expressed a belief that the mission 
did not persist.
The sidebar contains excerpts of responses from  
fund managers who believed the impact persisted.  
Many of these comments reflect that funds pursue  
companies that have social impact “embedded” as  
a core business element. 
Do fund managers have financial motivation  
to pursue non-aligned exits?
An assumption about the impact-investing industry is  
that mission-aligned exits necessarily entail concessionary 
financial returns. If true, fund managers would have 
financial motivation to pursue non-aligned exits in  
order to obtain higher returns for investors, placing  
the long-term preservation of portfolio company  
missions at risk.
WSII examined data from market-rate-seeking funds 
to find out whether the investors in this sample accepted 
a discounted price upon a successful mission-aligned 
exit, or whether fund managers achieved comparable  
market-rate returns while preserving mission. WSII  
examined the subset of funds seeking market-rate 
returns, assuming that the tension between liquidity and 
mission preservation would be most acute in this group. 
Sample responses for, “Why do you  
believe that the impact persisted?”
“The company has a strong impact mission which 
is communicated to and understood by investors 
pre-investment.”
“The company has a strong mission and investors 
are aligned with the mission.”
“The company is still in the same location.” (Mission 
is to create employment in urban distressed areas.)
“All our deals have their brand wrapped up in impact.”
“Microfinance activities continued.”
“The investment was structured as a self-liquidating 
investment, therefore the realization never affected 
the impact or purpose of business model.”
“As company continues to grow, the impact and the 
value it creates for the local community will only grow.”
“Fund remains on the board and is actively involved” 
(Not a full exit.)
“Commitment of one of the Board of Directors 
members.”
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35 It is important to note that the small sample size and distribution of returns play a large role in this calculation. The two  
 largest investments of the 16 mission-aligned exits were also two of the top three best performers of the group, with IRRs  
 of 120% and 60% respectively. Their investment size and performance buoys the aggregate IRR; however, this distribution  
 is not dissimilar to traditional private equity performance. Only three of the 16 mission-aligned exits returned negative IRRs.
The overall internal rate of return of realizations for the portfolio companies from market-rate-seeking 
funds is 18.59% – gross of fees, expenses, and carried interest.
WSII isolated mission-aligned exits and performed the same calculation. As noted above, aligned exits 
by definition exclude write-offs, as a company’s mission cannot persist if it goes out of business.  
Therefore, the team expected the IRR for aligned exits to be high relative to the 18.59% IRR for all 
exits in the sample. The gross internal rate of return for mission-aligned exits is 33.52%. 
In order to obtain a more comparable figure, WSII included the IRR of all portfolio company realizations 
in the sample, this time excluding write-offs. The gross internal rate of return for this group is 35.01%.
The number of exits in the dataset is modest. Still, for the exits that fund managers reported confidence 
in mission preservation – aligned exits – the gross IRR (33.52%) is comparable to the larger set of all 
exits, excluding write-offs (35.01%).35
A key point to highlight here is not that aligned exits produce similar returns as non-aligned exits  
but rather that this early data suggest aligned exits can demonstrate significant financial success.  
Concessionary financial returns are not required for the social or environmental impact of impact  
investments to persist, at least as reported by fund managers in this sample.
“The data show mission-aligned exits can demonstrate  
success – concessionary returns are not required for 










Gross IRR 18.59% 35.01% 33.52% Insufficient 
Sample
Cash Multiple 2.30x 4.12x 4.86x ”
n 51 32 16 3
Market-Rate-Seeking Exits, Gross Returns
*Note: Aligned Exit category includes seven Deeply Aligned Exits
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36 See Methods 1-4 outlined in the Methodology section for more information.
4. Overal l  Industry Performance
Would overall industry performance suggest that there is pressure to make non-aligned exits?
WSII assessed the financial performance of all portfolio companies in the sample in order to glimpse 
what might be expected for fund managers considering exits in the near future. If performance is  
not strong, fund managers may be tempted to seek maximum returns at the expense of mission  
preservation. On the other hand, if the industry is performing well, presumably there will be less 
tension between economics and mission preservation. 
WSII pooled end-to-end quarterly cash flows for all portfolio companies with verifiable financial data. 
This entire sample represents 240 companies since the first quarter of 2000. However, the following 
analysis is focused on market-rate-seeking funds, representing 170 portfolio companies.
Evaluating unrealized investments introduces an array of methodological challenges. For this sample, 
WSII conducted a best assessment of value of open investments based on multiple assumptions about 
company valuations. The following figures are largely dependent on how conservatively valued are 
the unrealized investments. WSII applied three distinct methodologies to assess a spectrum of overall 
performance of the sample.36
Aggregate gross IRR and cash multiple for all portfolio companies (realized  
and unrealized) from funds seeking market-rate returns.
 * Sample includes 81 portfolio companies reported at cost, whose terminal values were calculated using ratio  
   obtained from other companies in the sample set.
** Terminal Values for unrealized companies were treated as cash out at the time of the last observed value.
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Held at FMV 
or Cost
Held at FMV or (Cost x 
(Val FMV/Cost FMV))*


















n 170 170 89
Market-Rate-Seeking Funds: Aggregate Analysis**
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37 Method 2 from the Methodology section.
38 Although WSII received survey responses from 53 funds, segmenting the data creates challenges in terms of sample size.  
 For the confidence interval calculation, WSII required market rate-seeking funds to have submitted sufficient financial  
 documentation to recreate verifiable cash flow information. Sixteen funds met this criteria for this calculation.
39 Using the original set of individual fund PME calculations, the bootstrapping exercise randomly recreated 1,000 new sets 
 of data (replacing PME calculations and therefore allowing PMEs to be selected more than once).
Depending on the valuation methodology applied to open investments, impact investments in  
the sample demonstrated gross performance near market indices as seen by the PME calculations  
(between 0.89 and 1.09 for the Russell Microcap PME, and between 0.91 and 1.12 for the S&P  
500 PME).
In addition to the end-to-end calculations for all market-rate-seeking funds’ cash flows (as if part of  
one aggregate fund), WSII also analyzed performance on an individual fund basis. WSII compared  
gross performance of market-rate-seeking funds (when unrealized investments held at cost are 
adjusted according to reflect broader FMV valuations37) to a Russell Microcap index and found a 
median PME of 0.95.
Due to the sample size38, it is difficult to assess how representative these findings are for the general 
population of impact funds. However, WSII used a bootstrapping simulation (1,000x, with  
replacement)39 to calculate a confidence interval. Since a PME reflects performance relative to an  
index, a calculation of 1.00 indicates identical performance. WSII began statistical analysis with the  
null hypothesis that social impact investments perform the same as market indices. The following  
chart reflects the confidence interval for each calculation.
Confidence Interval  
(Lower Bound)














Market-Rate-Seeking Funds: Individual Analysis
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The median fund in the sample performed slightly below the benchmarks (since median PME < 1),  
but the bootstrapping exercise suggests that the researchers cannot reject in general that the entire  
industry segment of market-rate-seeking impact investing funds perform the same as the index (true 
median PME = 1) above a 95% confidence level. Due to the high variability of performance and 
small sample size, the confidence interval for the PME is broad. A larger sample will be necessary 
to refine these calculations and to narrow the confidence interval further in order to make larger 
and broader claims for the industry.
Great Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing
Discuss ion
Summary
The marked increase in capital under management in the impact investing private equity industry  
created a corresponding increase in deals. This research study sought to determine what one might  
expect to happen to a company’s social or environmental mission when impact investors seek  
liquidity in this wave of deals. 
Although this analysis relies on a modest sample of 53 funds, fund managers appear to have ample  
discretion from their LPs to make mission-aligned choices when exiting companies. In the vast  
majority of cases, fund managers have the latitude to consider social or environmental missions  
in their investment decisions. Indeed, most report their legal documentation (e.g., Limited Partnership 
Agreements, Private Placement Memoranda, and side letters) even require such consideration. It seems 
that if exit decisions were simply left to fund managers, these missions might be well protected.
In practice, however, portfolio company boards of directors usually control exit decisions, and in  
companies with special shareholder rights, these decisions are made at the shareholder level. In  
either case, the WSII sample shows that fund managers have insufficient control to fully exercise  
the discretion that their fund’s governing documents provide them, even when they include the  
voting power belonging to other investors who are aligned with their mission.
Despite this, fund managers report an expectation that the mission would persist in 95% of their  
successful exits (i.e. 95% of successful exits are mission-aligned) – even though 67% of the exits had  
no contractual statement to pursue the mission (much less a legally binding one.) Notwithstanding the 
lack of either documentation or sufficient control to support mission-aligned exits, one might wonder 
what generates this optimism towards mission preservation.
Early findings provide no evidence to suggest that these mission-aligned exits draw depressed financial 
outcomes. In fact, the data show that mission-aligned exits in the sample can provide strong returns. 
Perhaps then, boards and shareholders of impact companies often do not find themselves facing  
a difficult decision between an economically or socially motivated exit, and therefore the strict  
dichotomy of strong returns versus strong impact may be unfounded.
“Early findings provide no evidence to suggest that these mission-aligned  
exits draw depressed financial outcomes. In fact, the data show that  
mission-aligned exits in the sample can provide strong returns.”
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Further examination of industry performance bears this out. Preliminary analysis demonstrates a gross 
internal rate of return of 12.94% for impact investments made by the survey respondents (with  
important caveats as to the valuation of unrealized investments). Early results indicate financial  
performance is comparable to a Russell Microcap index (PME 0.98) and to an S&P 500 index (PME 
1.00) for the time period between 2000 and 2015. Impact investments in the sample, therefore,  
may be financially competitive with other equity investing investment opportunities. This financial  
performance may be why impact fund managers often assert that there is little inherent tension  
between profits and purpose.
This lack of tension may be driven by funds’ use of an “embedded impact” strategy. In other words, 
impact fund managers often use a pre-investment screening process to invest only in companies with 
products or services that are inherently impactful, making impact core to the investee’s business model. 
But absent contractual or governance protections, it would appear that fund managers and impact 
companies are making mission preservation largely reliant on the culture of the acquiring or controlling 
company. Company culture can be a powerful and enduring force, but it is reasonable to ask if there is 
ever really a product or service with mission so central to its value that it cannot be distorted or used 
contrary to its original intent.
Implications
If we are to assume fund managers are accurate in their assessments of mission persistence, additional 
protections on social mission at the time of exit may be of limited effect. For impact investors at large, 
the research findings highlight the importance of the due diligence stage of the investment process – 
even as it relates to post-exit impact. During the pre-investment phase, for example, impact investors 
may increasingly consider the extent to which the momentum of a company’s “embedded impact” may 
alone propel and insulate social performance. 
While investors must be attentive to the due diligence process, a reliance on pre-screening processes 
rather than formal controls to maintain impact after exit may limit a GP’s ability or motivation to  
scale impact. Just as the capital requirements of portfolio companies evolve over time, so too might 
capacity shortfalls related to social impact. GPs can avoid stagnation by catalyzing further development 
of impact by providing additional invested capital, management guidance, or other technical expertise. 
This approach can ensure that impact is not only “locked in” but also evolving along with revenue 
growth or market reach. 
“...impact fund managers often use a pre-investment screening process to invest only 
in companies with products or services that are inherently impactful, making impact 
core to the investee’s business model.”
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As previously discussed, the attribution of mission preservation to pre- rather than post-investment  
activities may be an indirect result of the limited controls investors retain when seeking liquidity:  
without majority control, an “embedded impact” strategy may provide social investors with the  
greatest traction in ensuring the long-term impact of their portfolio companies. However, the use  
of shareholder agreements or other contractual controls to codify social mission may effectively  
substitute for or bolster this approach, even when socially driven investors constitute a minority  
share. For example, minority shareholder protections such as right of first refusal or the requirement  
of a supermajority in decision-making could help to provide outsized influence to social investors  
at the point of exit, helping them to exert control over acquirer selection or dictate long-term  
institutional goals. Ultimately, a combination of controls, including pre-investment screening  
and shareholder agreements, can contribute to the preservation (and potential growth) of social  
or environmental performance. 
However, broader questions remain about the investors’ role in ensuring mission preservation. For 
example, some investors continue to question whether it is even a GP’s purview to influence or control 
performance after they exited the deal. Alternative and innovative forms of financing may be more 
consistent with the goals of impact investors, for example, and some posit that the traditional 5-7  
year time horizon for liquidity in the private equity model is insufficient, and that holding portfolio  
companies longer may allow them to mature and become large enough to dictate mission-related  
terms at the time of exit. 
Conclusion
The acceleration of deal flow in impact investing private equity – and the subsequent upsurge of 
realization events – continues to highlight the interplay between financial returns and social or  
environmental mission. As new investors enter the space, the demonstrated performance of these  
early investments may help to foster the continued growth of the field, particularly in terms of the 
market viability of mission preservation.
Impact funds in the sample that seek market-rate-returns demonstrate that they can achieve results 
comparable to market indices, while still reporting mission preservation in the vast majority of  
their exited investments. Investors will need more quantitative information to understand the causal 
mechanisms driving these double and triple bottom line returns, such as additional metrics on  
social impact pre and post exit, and further clarity on long-term impact. Ultimately, demand from  
LPs will drive the extent to which GPs are held accountable for the preservation of portfolio  
companies’ missions. Additional research in the field remains crucial to providing both GPs and  
LPs with the data needed to understand the landscape and to potentially unlock additional capital  
in support of scalable impact.
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